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INTRODUCTION 
Philosophers and ethicists have long disagreed about the 
permissibility of lying.' On one side of this divide are those such as Saint 
Augustine and Immanuel Kant who articulate a clear and categorical 
prohibition on lying., On the other side of the philosophical divide are 
those who reject a categorical approach in favor of a more nuanced 
view- that lies, at some times and tinder some circumstances, are 
justifiable.3 A similar debate is now taking place among lawyers and 
judges who work in the criminal justice system about the appropriateness 
of prosecutors· and defense lawyers assisting and supervising lies and 
other forms of deceit in investigating criminal cases. 
Is it ever ethical for a lawyer to ask or assist another to lie on behalf 
of a client? During the past year, I have asked many lawyers and judges 
r. For a discussion of the general topic of lying and other forms of deceit, see SISSELA BoK, 
LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1979). 
2. See id. at 34· 
3· See id. at 30 ("While we know the risks of lying, and would prefer a world where others 
abstained from it, we know also that there are times when it would be helpful, perhaps even necessary, 
if we ourselves could deceive with impunity."). 
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this question in a series of discussion forums around the United States on 
proposed changes to the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice 
Standards. When one asks lawyers and judges whether it is ethical for a 
lawyer to ask or assist another to lie on behalf of a client, my experience 
has been that the most likely initial answer is a categorical, almost 
reflexive, "no," which seems to echo Augustine and Kant. Further 
discussion and reflection, though, tends to reveal a range of more 
nuanced views about investigative deceit, especially in criminal practice. 
The recognition that prosecutors regularly supervise police and 
informants who engage in deceit makes many lawyers uncomfortable 
with a categorical prohibition. 
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as well as state 
legal ethics codes across the United States modeled on these Model 
Rules have long set forth categorical prohibitions of false statements and 
other forms of deceit.4 But a growing number of jurisdictions have 
concluded that such categorical prohibitions should yield to the needs 
and customs of criminal law enforcement and criminal defense practice, 
and have authorized the use of investigative deceit. A wide range of both 
moral and practical concerns appears to have driven this trend of 
reexamining and modifying categorical bans on deceit. 
Part I of this Essay sets out the existing provisions of the Model 
Rules that are most relevant to the use of investigative deceit. Part II 
describes how a number of jurisdictions have recently modified their 
stances and taken a variety of approaches in permitting such deceit. Part 
III canvasses various arguments for and against abandoning the 
categorical view. 
I. THE ISSUE 
In exploring various rules and arguments about investigative deceit, 
it will be helpful at various points in this Essay to have some concrete 
factual scenarios to which to refer. Consider the following two scenarios. 
Scenario A: Lawyer A's client is charged with possessing child 
pornography on his work computer and forcing a twelve-year-old 
Complainant to view the pornography. Client A and Complainant 
A were acquainted through a mentoring program, and 
Complainant A often spent time at Client A's place of work. 
Complainant A knew Client A's computer password and offered to 
show the investigating officer the location of the pornographic 
images. 
Lawyer A learns that Complainant A has a history of both false 
sexual allegations and of accessing pornography on the Internet. 
4· See, e.g., MoDEL CoDE oF PROF'L REsPoNsmruTY DR r-r02(A)(4), DR 7-102(A)(5) (1969); 
STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 305-306, 498-505 (2010 
ed. 2010) (discussing state adoptions and variations of Model Rule 4.1(A) and Model Rule 8-4(c)). 
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Lawyer A strongly suspects Complainant A, rather than his client, 
accessed and placed the pornography on Client A's computer. 
Lawyer A wants to inspect Complainant A's home computer for 
similar pornography, which would help exculpate Client A by 
supporting the inference that Complainant A rather than Client A 
was responsible for the pornography on Client A's computer. 
Lawyer A is afraid, however, that if he openly asks Complainant A 
to do so, then he will destroy any pornographic images on his 
computer. 
Lawyer A wants to hire a private investigator to gain access to 
Complainant A's computer through deception. The private 
investigator would pose as a computer consultant conducting a 
survey of computer use by young people. He would contact 
Complainant A and his family and offer to swap Complainant A's 
computer for a new laptop computer that would purportedly allow 
the consultant to monitor Complainant A's computer use. Once the 
private investigator obtains Complainant A's computer, Lawyer A 
plans to have an expert examine the computer for pornography. 
*** 
Scenario B: Lawyer B's client is charged with sexual assault based 
on allegations that he had sexual intercourse with a young woman 
without her consent. Both Client B and Complainant B are 
students at a large university who knew one another well prior to 
the alleged rape. The charged crime is alleged to have taken place 
in Client B's bedroom at a fraternity on the night of a party 
following a football game. Client B admits the intercourse took 
place but claims that Complainant B consented. Complainant B has 
told police that she did not consent and that Client B had 
intercourse with her when she was unconscious, having passed out 
after admittedly drinking too heavily at the party. 
Lawyer B interviews a mutual acquaintance of both Client Band 
Complainant B, who tells her that Client B and Complainant B 
were dating for the six months prior to the alleged rape and that 
their relationship had become turbulent in the weeks just prior to 
the incident. Client B was upset that Complainant B was 
considering breaking off their relationship and accepting a job after 
graduation in a distant city. The friend tells Lawyer B that 
Complainant B tends to be a very moderate drinker. The friend 
also says that Complainant B, as well as many of her friends who 
were at the party in question, have been discussing both the alleged 
rape and ComplainantB's relationship with Client B extensively on 
Complainant B's Facebook page. 
Lawyer B wants to hire a private investigator to gain access to 
Complainant B's Facebook page through deception. The private 
investigator, a forty-five-year-old former police officer, maintains 
two Facebook pages under assumed names. On one of these pages, 
he presents himself as a twenty-one-year-old male university 
student and, on the other, as a nineteen-year-old female university 
student. Both pages use photos that are not of the investigator, but 
of attractive young people. The investigator, using one or both of 
his undercover Facebook personas, would attempt to have 
Complainant B "friend" him to allow him access to her page. He 
\ 
1377 
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would examine the page for any useful exculpatory or impeachment 
material. He would also attempt to engage Complainant B in 
conversation, seeking to obtain exculpatory and impeachment 
material. 
Lawyers A and B come to you for advice. Are their investigative 
plans ethically permissible under the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct? · 
Several Model Rules bear on the use of deceit in investigations and 
interact to create potential ethical liability for both Lawyer A and 
Lawyer B. Among them, Rules 5·3 and 8.4(a) deal with the responsibility 
of lawyers regarding the acts of nonlawyers.5 Rules 4.1 and 8-4( c), on the 
other hand, directly address false statements and other forms of deceit.6 
Lawyers do, at times, choose to conduct their own undercover 
factual investigations.7 But for a number of reasons, they typically leave 
such work to other people, usually nonlawyers. A lawyer may lack the 
skills needed for effective investigation or simply fear the physical risks it 
might entail in the criminal context. A lawyer might be concerned that, 
because of her role as counsel, she is likely to be recognized by those 
being investigated. The advocate-witness rule also discourages a lawyer 
from personally engaging in such factual investigation. If the lawyer 
becomes a key witness by participating in an investigation, the lawyer 
may well be disqualified from participating in the case as counsel.8 
A. RESPONSIDILITY FOR THE ACTS OF OTHERS 
Model Rules 5-3 and 8-4(a) can create ethical liability for lawyers 
related to the acts of nonlawyers. Both rules apply to conduct by a 
nonlawyer that is inconsistent with the professional obligations of a 
lawyer.9 
Rule 5-3, entitled "Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants," 
imposes both obligations and responsibilities on lawyers " [ w ]ith respect 
to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a lawyer."'" A 
lawyer hiring someone to conduct an investigation of the sort described 
in Scenarios A and B above could trigger two separate sections of Rule 
5-3· Subsection (b) requires a lawyer supervising a nonlawyer to "make 
reasonable efforts to ensure" that the nonlawyer's "conduct is 
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer."" Under Rule 
5.3(b), a lawyer who employs an investigator who engages in deceit 
5· MoDEL RuLES oF PRoF'L CoNoucr R. 5.3, 8.4(a) (2010). 
6. ld. R. 4.1, 8-4(c). 
7· See, e.g., In re Gatti, 8 P.3d g66, 969 (Or. 2000). 
8. See MoDEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNOucr R. 3.7(a) (2010) ("A lawyer shall not act as advocate at 
a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness .... "). 
9· See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCf R. 5.3, 8-4(a) (2010). 
10. Id. R. 5·3 (emphasis added). 
II. Jd. R. 5-3(b). 
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might be sanctioned for the lawyer's own failure to make a reasonable 
effort to prevent the investigator from using deceit. 12 Ethical liability 
under Rule 5-3(b ), while clearly related to the nonlawyer's use of deceit, 
is not truly vicarious, since it is based on the lawyer's own omission. 
Subsection (c) of Rule 5-3, in contrast to subsection (b), imposes 
ethical liability for a lawyer's acts rather than omissions. It states that the 
lawyer "shall be responsible" for conduct by a nonlawyer assistant if the 
lawyer "orders" or "ratifies" the conduct. 13 Subsection (c) makes the 
lawyer responsible for the investigator's conduct and, thus, imposes true 
vicarious liability. 14 
Rule 8-4(a) also creates potential ethical liability for a lawyer who 
hires an investigator who uses deceit. Rule 8-4(a) states: "It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do 
so through the acts of another ... . "'5 As with Rule 5.3, Rule 8.4(a) 
creates two different paths to liability. First, the lawyer might be 
sanctioned for assisting or inducing the investigative deceit, with liability 
roughly equivalent to criminal law accomplice liability. Second, the 
lawyer might be sanctioned for violating ethical rules about deceit 
"through the acts of another." 
In sum, Rules 5-3 and 8-4(a) together create four possible avenues 
for ethics authorities to sanction Lawyers A and B in the fact patterns 
above: (r) failing to stop the deceit, (2) ordering or ratifying the deceit, 
(3) assisting or inducing the deceit, and (4) engaging in deceit "through 
the acts of another." Defense attorneys, such as Lawyers A and B, who 
use nonlawyers to conduct undercover investigations, open themselves to 
each avenue of liability. An investigator hired by a defense lawyer easily 
falls within Rule 5·3 's broad language of being "employed or retained by 
or associated with" the defense lawyer. 16 Such a lawyer fails to take 
measures to stop the deceit, fulfilling Rule 5.3(b ), and also orders and 
ratifies the deceit, fulfilling Rule 5.3(c). Such a lawyer also knowingly 
assists and induces the investigator, as required by Rule 8-4(a), by 
providing information and payment. For the same reason, the lawyer can 
easily be said to be violating prohibitions on deceit through the acts of 
another. 
The prosecutor's relationship with police or informants who engage 
in deceit does not fall quite so easily within all of these provisions as does 
the relationship between a private lawyer and a private investigator. 
Nonetheless, the language in both Rules 5-3 and 8-4(a) is broad enough 
12. See id. 
13. ld. R. 5.3(c) (emphasis added). 
14. See id. 
15. I d. R. 8-4(a) (emphasis added). 
r6. I d. R. 5·3· 
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to make prosecutors ethically liable for investigative deceit by police and 
informants. Police officers who operate undercover, for example, are not 
"employed or retained" by prosecutors.17 They are employed by the 
police department, not the district attorney's office. But police and 
informants used by police and prosecutors can easily be said to be 
"associated" with the prosecutor, thus triggering liability under Rule 
J8 
5·3· 
B. LYING AND DECEIT 
In order to trigger lawyer liability under Rules 5-3 and 8-4(a), the 
conduct of an investigator must be such that it would violate ethical rules 
"if engaged in by a lawyer."19 What do the Model Rules say, then, about 
lies and other forms of deceit? 
Two key Model Rules directly address lying and deceit. Rule 4.1 
states, "In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not 
knowingly: (a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person .... "'a Comment 2 to Rule 4.1 employs a definitional sleight-of-
hand to exempt some types of false statements typically made in the 
context of negotiations, such as estimates of price or value, from Rule 
4.1(a)'s prohibition.'! The comments to Rule 4.1 currently contain no 
similar exemption for false statements made during criminal 
investigations, whether by prosecution or by defense. 
Undercover investigations routinely involve the making of material 
false statements of fact. Investigators going "undercover" and informants 
cooperating with the police make false statements of fact about their 
identities and purposes. In order to establish credibility, investigators and 
informants may also make false statements with respect to such things as 
their prior criminal history and connections with criminals. In Scenario A 
above, for example, the investigator would make false statements about 
who he is, his work and employer, and the reason he wants to swap a new 
laptop for Complainant A's computer. If asked, he would also make a 
false statement about what will happen to the Complainant's computer 
during the swap and where it will be kept. In Scenario B, the investigator 
going on Facebook to investigate the rape allegations will make false 
17. See id. ("With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a 
lawyer .... "). 
18. See id. 
19. ld. R. 5.3(c). 
20. I d. R. 4.1 (a). 
21. Id. cmt. 2 ("Tbis Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement should be 
regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under generally accepted conventions in 
negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. 
Estimates of price or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as to an 
acceptable settlement of a claim are ordinarily in this category, and so is the existence of an· 
undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of tbe principal would constitute fraud."). 
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statements about his name, age, gender, occupation, physical description, 
and any other information needed to create the Facebook page of his 
undercover persona. He will also make additional false statements, if 
necessary, to have Complainant B grant him access to her Facebook 
page. 
The other key rule addressing deceit is Rule 8.4(c), which provides 
that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation .... "22 This 
provision is broader than Rule 4.r(a)'s prohibition of false statements. It 
bans false statements and a great deal more. For the reasons pointed out 
above,23 undercover investigations often involve "dishonesty," "deceit" 
and, "misrepresentation." 
The language of Rules 4.r(a) and 8-4(c) clearly bars the sorts of 
statements and other conduct engaged in by private defense 
investigators, police, and informants during undercover investigations if 
they were "engaged in by a lawyer." Rules 5·3 and 8-4(a) make lawyers 
ethically liable for such statements made by nonlawyers employed, 
retained, or associated with them. 24 These rules on their face thus dictate 
ethical liability for the lawyers in Scenarios A and B. The language of 
these rules also dictates ethical liability for prosecutors associated with 
police and informants who make similar false statements and engage in 
similar undercover deceit. 
What should we make of the fact that these categorical rules were 
adopted at a time when it was widely recognized that prosecutors 
regularly supervise police and informants who engage in undercover 
deceit in pursuing investigations? Were these rules meant to curb 
prosecutorial participation in and acceptance of such undercover 
investigative techniques? Did the Model Rules' drafters intend to 
exempt prosecutors despite not recording such an exemption within the 
text or comments of the applicable ethical rules? Or did it just not occur 
to them that prosecutorial involvement in undercover investigations was 
implicated by these Rules? We will return to these questions below. 
II. CuRRENT APPROACHES 
A number of jurisdictions have modified their ethics rules to allow 
lawyers to utilize deceptive investigations. The substance of these 
modifications varies from state to state. Some exempt only government 
lawyers from the deceit rules when they are pursuing undercover 
investigations, which I refer to below as an "asymmetrical" approach. 
Others exempt both prosecutors and defense counsel, which I refer to as 
22. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 8-4(c) (2010). 
23. See discussion supra Part LB. 
24. See discussion supra Part LA. 
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a "symmetrical" approach. Some states allow lawyers personally to 
engage in deceit, which I refer to as "personal" deceit. More commonly, 
though, jurisdictions maintain a ban on personal deceit by lawyers, while 
allowing lawyers to participate in investigations in which someone else, 
such as a police officer or private investigator, does the deceiving. I refer 
to this approach as permitting "vicarious" deception. 
States that allow investigative deceit have accomplished this result 
through a variety of means. Some have chosen to amend the text of their 
ethical rules in a variety of ways, such as allowing investigative deceit 
through amendment of a comment to their ethical rules. Still other 
jurisdictions have created an investigative deceit exception through the 
interpretation of existing rules by a court or an ethics committee. 
A. THE AsYMMETRICAL APPROACH 
A few jurisdictions have created exemptions from their versions of 
the Model Rules for prosecutors. In these jurisdictions, neither Lawyer A 
nor Lawyer B, as defense lawyers, would be permitted to use the 
investigative techniques proposed above. 
Florida amended its analog to Model Rule 8-4(c) to include the 
following: "[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer for a 
criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency to advise others 
about or to supervise another in an undercover investigation .... "25 The 
comment to this language makes clear that it exempts government 
lawyers from both the deceit provisions of Rule 8.3 as well as the false 
statement provision of Rule 4.1: 
Subdivision (c) recognizes instances where lawyers in criminal law 
enforcement agencies or regulatory agencies advise others about or 
supervise others in undercover investigations, and provides an 
exception to allow the activity without the lawyer engaging in 
professional misconduct. The exception acknowledges current, 
acceptable practice of these agencies. Although the exception appears 
in this rule, it is also applicable to rules 4-4.1 and 4-4.3.26 
This language in the Florida version of Rule 8-4( c) adopts an 
asymmetrical approach that allows vicarious deception by government 
lawyers. The Rule avoids explicitly stating that these investigations 
involve false statements and deceit, choosing to imply such falsity and 
deceit by use of the word "undercover." Florida's Rule 8.4 also has an 
unusual and narrowly crafted exemption, which allows personal deceit by 
a lawyer who is working for the government as an investigative agent 
rather than as a lawyer.27 
25. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-8-4(c) (2010). 
26. ld. cmt. 
27. I d. R. 4-8-4(c) ("[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer employed in a capacity 
other than as a lawyer by a criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency to participate in an 
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Alabama has taken a different path to creating an asymmetrical 
vicarious deceit exemption for government lawyers. Rather than 
modifying the rules that directly deal with false statement and deceit, its 
versions of Rules 4.1 and 8.4(c), Alabama chose to modify its version of 
Rule 3.8, entitled "Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor." The relevant 
language of Alabama's Rule 3.8(2) states: 
(a) Notwithstanding Rules 5-3 and 8.4, the prosecutor, through 
orders, directions, advice and encouragement, may cause other 
agencies and offices of government, and may cause non-lawyers 
employed or retained by or associated with the prosecutor, to engage 
in any action that is not prohibited by law . .. ; and 
(b) To the extent an action of the government is not prohibited by 
law but would violate these Rules if done by a lawyer, the prosecutor 
(1) may have limited participation in the action, as provided in (2)(a) 
above, but (2) shall not personally act in violation of these Rules. '8 
The Alabama drafters were more circumspect than Florida's about 
approving participation in undercover investigations. The phrase "any 
action that is not prohibited by law" in 3.8(2)(a) could cover a whole host 
of things. The phrase "shall not personally act in violation" in 3.8(2)(b) 
appears to exempt only vicarious deception, and the language "may have 
limited participation" sets an undefined limit on prosecutorial 
involvement in vicarious deception. 
The comment to the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct is 
much more forthcoming. It specifically states: 
in undercover and sting operations, the making of false statements is 
the essence of the activity. The prosecutor is prohibited by Rule 4.1(a) 
from making false statements and is prohibited by Rule 8-4(a) from 
knowingly assisting or inducing another to violate the 
Rules .... [P]aragraph (2)(a) makes clear that the prosecutor may 
order, direct, encourage and advise with respect to any lawful 
governmental action. However, where lawyers generally are prohibited 
by the Rules from taking an action, the prosecutor is likewise 
prohibited from personally violating the Rules. In such situations, the 
prosecutor's actions, as distinct from those of other governmental 
entities, are limited so as to preserve the integrity of the profession of 
law.'9 
Thus, Alabama's investigative deceit exemption is both asymmetrical 
and vicarious, like Florida's. But Alabama's is also narrower than 
Florida's in that it exempts only prosecutors, not all government 
lawyers.30 
undercover investigation .... "). 
28. ALA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2) (2009) (emphasis added). 
29. ld. cmt. (emphasis added). 
30. ld. ("Paragraph (2) is applicable only to lawyers acting as prosecutors. It is designed to 
acco=odate the prosecutor's special responsibility in governmental law-enforcement activities and is 
not applicable otherwise." (emphasis added)). 
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Utah also has an investigative deceit exemption for government 
lawyers. But unlike Florida and Alabama, Utah created this exemption 
through an ethics opinion interpreting Utah's version of Ru1e 8.4(c).31 A 
Utah bar member "who works for a federal agency that routinely 
performs undercover investigative work and covert actions directed 
against criminal and terrorist groups" asked whether his supervision or 
participation in such activities violated Utah's version of Rule 8.4(c).3' 
The committee that wrote the opinion acknowledged that the text of 
Rule 8-4(c) appears to ban government lawyers from participating 
personally or vicariously in investigative deceit.33 Relying on the 
comment to 8.4(c), however, the ethics opinion concluded that the 
drafters of Rule 8-4(c) did not intend to ban the use of investigative 
deceit by government lawyers.34 The committee specifically reserved the 
question of whether "the analysis and result of this opinion apply to a 
private lawyer's investigative conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, 
misrepresentation or deceit."35 
Finally, in jurisdictions that have not dealt specifically with the 
subject either through rule amendment or interpretation, despite the 
categorical bans on misrepresentation and deceit that exist in virtually 
every jurisdiction, prosecutors are not, in fact, disciplined on the basis of 
vicarious ethical responsibility for the misrepresentations and deceit of 
police and informants whom they advise and supervise. Prosecutors in 
these jurisdictions thus have a de facto exemption to supervise 
investigative deceit. 
B. THE SYMMETRJCAL APPROACH 
A number of jurisdictions now allow both prosecutors and private 
lawyers to participate in vicarious investigative deceie6 In all of these 
jurisdictions, Lawyer A and Lawyer B in the scenarios described above 
would be allowed to pursue their proposed investigations. 
As with the asymmetrical approach described above, some 
jurisdictions have accomplished this by amending the text of and 
comments to their ethics rules. States that have amended their ethics 
rules and comments have taken different textual routes to such 
amendments. 
Some states have adopted language explicitly permitting lawyers to 
supervise covert investigations. Oregon's version of Rule 8.4 is 
31. Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 02-05 (Mar. 18, 2002). 
32. !d. at~ 3· 
33· !d. at 'll 4· 
34· See id. at 'II ro. 
35· ld. at 'II 2 n.I. 
36. See, e.g., Omo RULES OF PRoF'L CoNnucr R. 8.4 cmt. 2A (2ou); OR. RuLES OF PRoF'L 
CONDUcr R. 8-4(b) (2oro); WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf FOR ATTORNEYS SCR 20:4.1 (2010). 
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symmetrical but limited to exempting vicarious investigative deceit. It 
states: 
[I]t shall not be professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients 
or others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the 
investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional 
rights, provided the lawyer's conduct is otherwise in compliance with 
these Rules of Professional Conduct.37 
Rather than relying on the word "covert" to imply that false statements 
and deceit are allowed, the Oregon Rule goes on to state forthrightly: 
'"Covert activity,' as used in this rule, means an effort to obtain 
information on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations 
or other subterfuge. "38 Oregon Rule 8-4(b ), though, places a limit on its 
investigative deceit exemption by adding a sort of "probable cause" 
requirement, requiring that the lawyer, prior to using deceit, have a good 
faith belief in the existence of the unlawful activity the covert 
investigation is aimed at revealing.39 
Ohio also adopted a symmetrical and vicarious exemption, using 
language similar to Oregon's version of Rule 8-4(b). But Ohio did so by 
adding the language to its comment to Rule 8-4(c), rather than by 
amending the language of the Rule. The Ohio comment explains that the 
Rule "does not prohibit a lawyer from supervising or advising about 
lawful covert activity in the investigation of criminal activity or violations 
of constitutional or civil rights when authorized by law."4" While clearly 
allowing both government and private lawyers to engage in vicarious 
investigative deceit, Ohio is not as forthright as Oregon m 
acknowledging that "covert activity" entails lies and deceit. 
Wisconsin has also adopted a symmetrical exemption for 
investigative deceit. Rather than amending the text of or comment to its 
Rule 8.4(c), though, Wisconsin amended its version of Rule 4.1 by adding 
a new subsection (b). The subsection reads: "Notwithstanding par[agraph] 
(a) and [Rules 5-J(c)(r) and 8-4], a lawyer may advise or supervise others 
with respect to lawful investigative activities. "4 ' The Wisconsin 
amendment to its Rule 4.1 is more circumspect in its approval of 
investigative deceit than is the Oregon amendment to its Rule 8-4(b ), 
which explicitly approves covert activity and openly acknowledges that 
such activity involves lies and deceit.42 Wisconsin relies on the phrase 
"lawful investigative activity" to imply investigative deceit. 
37· OR. RULES OF PRoF'L CoNDUCf R. 8-4(b) (2010). 
38. !d. 
39· See id. ("'Covert activity' may be commenced by a lawyer or involve a lawyer as an advisor or 
supervisor only when the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful 
activity has taken place, is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future."). 
40. Omo RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCf R. 8.4 cmt. 2A (2orr). 
4I. Wrs. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCf FOR ATTORNEYS SCR 20:4.1 (20!0). 
42· See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
1377 
.It 
:nts 
ttly: 
tain 
ons 
t its 
tse" 
ood 
vert 
;rng 
) by 
by 
the 
lOUt 
ons 
arly 
!OUS 
ill 
for 
) its 
ling 
tph] 
1ers 
1sin 
of 
(b), 
that 
·ase 
or or 
1wful 
.\ 
May2o1I] INVESTIGATNE DECEIT 
The comment to the Wisconsin amendment is more forthright about 
its approval of deception. It states: 
[A] lawyer may advise a client concerning whether proposed conduct is 
lawful. ... This is allowed even in circumstances in which the conduct 
involves some jom1 of deception, for example the use of testers to 
investigate unlawful discrimination or the use of undercover detectives 
to investigate theft in the workplace .... Paragraph (b) recognizes that, 
where the law expressly permits it, lawyers may have limited 
involvement in certain investigative activities involving deception.43 
Wisconsin, like Oregon, adds a good faith limitation to its investigative 
deceit exemption. 44 
The backstory to Wisconsin's adoption of an investigative deceit 
exemption is particularly interesting. Prior to the amendment of its Rule 
4.1, but while the amendment was under consideration, Wisconsin ethics 
authorities dealt with a case involving a criminal defense lawyer's use of 
vicarious investigative deceit. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Hurley 
dealt with discipline of a lawyer who, in facts similar to those in Scenario 
A, hired an investigator to use deception to obtain the complaining 
witness's computer.45 After doing so, a forensic computer expert found 
pornography on the complainant's computer, as the lawyer expected.46 
Soon after the deceptive investigation was revealed, disciplinary charges 
were brought against the lawyer.47 
In Hurley, a referee assigned to make a report and recommendation 
found the lawyer's use of investigative deceit did not violate either Rule 
4.1 or Rule 8-4( c). 48 She also found that his conduct was justified by his 
constitutional obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel.49 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court later adopted the referee's reasoning.50 
C. CoNTINUING AMBIGUITY 
Virginia has taken a different textual route to allowing lawyers to 
participate in deceit during investigations. Rather than directly 
addressing either "covert investigations" or "investigative activities," as 
Oregon and Wisconsin did in amending their versions of Rule 8-4(c), 
Virginia modified its version of Rule 8-4(c) by restricting that Rule's 
43· WIS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT FOR ATIORNEYS SCR 20:4.I cmt. (20!0) (emphasis added). 
44· !d. ("Lawful investigative activity may involve a lawyer as an advisor or supervisor only when 
the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, 
is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future." (emphasis added)). 
45· No. 07 AP 478-D, 2008 Wise. LEXIS II8I, at *8-11 (Wis. Feb. 5, 2008). 
46. !d. at *II. 
47· ld. at *I2. 
48. !d. at *17, *26. 
49- ld. at *33-38. 
50. Letter from Supreme Court of Wisconsin to the Office of Lawyer Regulation 1 (Feb. I I, 
2009) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal) ("We conclude that the referee's findings of fact are not 
clearly erroneous, and we also uphold the referee's conclusions of law .... "). 
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prohibition to include only dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
that "reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law."5 ' In short, 
Virginia took language commonly used in Rule 8-4(b )52 to restrict the 
types of criminal conduct for which a lawyer may be disciplined, then 
modified and grafted it onto Rule 8-4( c) to restrict the types of deceit for 
which a lawyer may be disciplined. 
The Virginia amendment to Rule 8.4(c) is not nearly as clear as the 
language used by Oregon, Ohio, and Wisconsin in permitting 
investigative deceit. It appears broader, since its language is not limited 
to the use of misrepresentation and deceit in the context of 
investigations, and it does not explicitly limit permissible conduct to 
vicarious deceit.53 Rather, its language seems to allow lawyers themselves 
to engage in acts of misrepresentation and deceit in order to obtain 
exculpating, impeaching, or mitigating evidence or information. 
Does Virginia Rule 8.4(c) create a symmetrical or an asymmetrical 
exception? The text of the current rule fails to distinguish between 
government and private lawyers, suggesting that it operates 
symmetrically. But a Virginia ethics opinion written shortly after Virginia 
amended its Rule 8-4(c) creates doubt about this question. A Virginia 
attorney asked a Virginia ethics committee "[w]hether an attorney 
working for a federal intelligence agency can perform undercover work 
without violating Rule 8-4. "54 The committee's opinion states: 
[T]he committee agrees with the requester that intelligence and covert 
activities of attorneys working for the federal government are an 
appropriate exception under the new language of Rule 8-4(c), with its 
additional language limiting prohibition only to such conduct that 
"reflects adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." Accordingly, 
the committee opines that when an attorney employed by the federal 
government uses lawful methods, such as the use of "alias identities" 
and non-consensual tape recording, as part of his intelligence or covert 
activities, those methods cannot be seen as reflecting adversely on his 
fitness to practice law; therefore, such conduct will not violate the 
prohibition in Rule 8-4( c ).55 
This passage indicates fairly clearly that personal as well as investigative 
deceit is permissible for a lawyer. However, the italicized language 
suggests that the exemption is limited to government lawyers, although 
the opinion does not explicitly set such a limit. 
5L VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer 
to: ... (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation which reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's fitness to practice law."). 
52. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 8.4(b) (zoro) ("It is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to: ... (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness 
or fitness as a lawyer in other respects .... " (emphasis added)). 
53· See VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009). 
54· Va. State Bar Council to Review Legal Ethics, Op. 1765 (June 13, 2003). 
55· ld. (emphasis added). 
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Another area of uncertainty is how state ethics committees and 
courts will interpret ethics rules in the many jurisdictions that still have 
unamended versions of Rules 4.1 and 8.4(c) setting forth unqualified 
bans on false statements and deceit. Ethics committees and courts in 
these states may adopt an intentionalist approach in interpreting those 
rules and ignore their plain language. It will be difficult for lawyers to 
predict how state ethics authorities and courts will interpret such ethics 
rules. 
Even in jurisdictions that have explicitly approved investigative 
deceit, there is ambiguity. For example, Florida explicitly modified its 
version of Rule 8-4( c) to allow government lawyers to supervise 
undercover investigations.56 Does the fact that the Rule mentions only 
government lawyers mean that defense lawyers cannot supervise such 
investigations? New York Ethics Opinion 737 approves lintited deceit in 
the investigation of "civil rights or intellectual property" cases but is 
silent on criminal cases. 57 
III. THE ARGUMENTS 
A range of arguments can be advanced both for and against 
allowing lawyers to employ deceit in covert investigations. 
A. UTILITY 
. Legal and ethical prohibitions as well as moral condemnation of 
deceit are based in part on the harms deceit tends to cause both to 
individuals and society.58 The enticement of investigative deception, 
though, lies largely in its potential benefits to both society and to 
individuals by uncovering truth and falsity. An undercover agent or 
informant who lies about her identity and purposes, for example, may 
learn the true identities, future plans, and past misdeeds of members of 
an organization involved in drug dealing, sex trafficking, or terrorism. A 
police sting operation may uncover and help remedy corruption and lies 
by public officials. The truth such deception brings forth helps to ensure 
that the blameworthy are punished and the dangerous are deterred and 
incapacitated. 
Misrepresentation and deceit by both defense investigators and 
police are motivated by the same laudable goal of ultimately producing 
some greater truth about guilt or innocence and improving the quality of 
proof used to support a criminal charge. In Scenario A, above, evidence 
of the presence of pornography on Complainant A's computer would 
help the jury determine the truth about Client A's conduct and 
56. FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c) (2002). 
57· New York Cnty. Lawyers' Ass'n Comm. on Prof'! Ethics, Formal Op. 737 (May 23, 2007). 
58. See, e.g., BoK, supra note I, at 18-31. 
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Complainant A's allegations. In Scenario B, the defense investigator's 
.Facebook ruse may uncover additional witnesses or reveal misconduct or 
untruthfulness on the part of Complainant B or other prosecution 
witnesses that would persuade the prosecutor to drop or reduce the 
charges or to impeach the witnesses at trial. 
B. NECESSITY 
Investigative deception, in addition to being useful, is also often 
necessary in dealing with crimes and criminals. Prosecutors and police 
often need to use deceit to find the truth, because criminal activity tends 
to be clandestine. Crimes, by their very nature, are usually committed 
covertly, since detection leads not only to possible prosecution and 
punishment, but also to social condemnation. In addition to having a 
motive to lie, those who commit crimes are often seen as having a poor 
character for veracity, a view reflected in our evidentiary rules regarding 
impeachment.59 Many witnesses to crimes, such as drug distribution and 
organized crime, are likely to have powerful motivations to lie out of fear 
of implication or retaliation. Again, deception is often necessary to get 
such people to reveal the truth. 
As with arguments based on utility, defense counsel can make the 
same argument as police and prosecutors about the need for deceit in 
investigating criminal cases. Like prosecutors and police, defense lawyers 
and their investigators must investigate clandestine activity and deal with 
people likely to lie. 
C. FAIRNESS 
As we have seen, the language of the bans on misreraresentation and 
deceit found in Rule 4.r(a) and 8-4(c) is unqualified. o This language 
covers prosecutors as well as defense lawyers and lawyers in civil 
practice.6' Nonetheless, prosecutors, without negative ethical consequences 
or even much criticism, regularly supervise and advise police in the use of 
covert investigations that employ misrepresentation and deceit. Such 
tactics are used to investigate a wide range of crimes, a tendency that 
both the "war on drugs" and the "war on terror" have reinforced. One 
might then argue that simple fairness dictates that defense lawyers be 
treated the same as prosecutors and allowed to use investigative 
deception without fear of ethical sanction, especially in light of their 
constitutional obligation to provide effective representation.62 
59· See, e.g., FED. R. Evid. 6og (allowing impeachment of a witness on the basis of a prior criminal 
conviction). 
6o. See discussion supra Part LB. 
6r. See discussion supra Part LB. 
62. U.S. CaNsT. amend. VI. 
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A possible response to the preceding argument in favor of what I 
have called symmetry in permitting investigative deceit is that 
prosecutors should be exempted because they have the burden of 
proving criminal offenses and must meet the demanding "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard of proof. Our criminal justice system gives 
prosecutors a number of tools, such as conducting wiretaps, obtaining 
search warrants, and immunizing or making deals with witnesses who 
face criminal liability, to which defense lawyers lack access. Why 
shouldn't we treat investigative deceit like these other devices and make 
it available only to the prosecution? 
One might well draw precisely the opposite conclusion, however, 
from the fact that prosecutors have exclusive use of so many investigative 
tools not available to defense counsel. Because the defense lacks access 
to tools such as wiretaps and immunity, it can be argued that the defense 
has a greater need than the prosecution for access to investigative 
deception. Defense counsel lacks these alternatives to investigative 
deceit in dealing with recalcitrant witnesses. 
D. ENCOURAGING AND ENABLING EFFECTIVE AssiSTANCE 
The need for more thorough defense investigation and greater 
defense access to resources to support investigation has become a mantra 
of those who seek to improve the quality of defense representation in the 
United States.63 DNA evidence in recent decades has revealed numerous 
wrongful convictions, and analysis of these has disclosed a number of 
contributing factors. 64 One of these factors is lack of effective assistance 
of counsel and, in particular, lack of competent and thorough defense 
investigation.65 
The fact that many defense lawyers regularly under-investigate 
cases due to lack of time, resources, or inclination suggests that putting a 
valuable investigative tool such as undercover investigation ethically out 
of bounds for defense lawyers is unwise. If anything, it supports 
increasing the investigative options available to the defense and 
encouraging use of these options. 
Several defense lawyers with whom I spoke during a series of 
discussions around the country sponsored by the ABA Criminal Justice 
63. See generally Adele Bernhard, Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the 
Delivery of Criminal Defense Sendces, 63 U. PnT. L. REv. 293 (2002); Paul C. Giannelli, Alee v. 
Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CoRNELL L. REv. 
1305 (2004); Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006 W1s. L. 
REY.739· 
64. See The Causes of Wrongful Conviction, THE INNocENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceprojecl.org/ 
understand/ (last visited May 23, 2DI r ). 
65. See, e.g., Bernhard, supra note 63, at 294; Giannelli, supra note 63, at 1356-58; Uphoff, supra 
note 63, at 744-64; Bad Lawyering, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
understand/Bad-Lawyering.php (last visited May 23, 2on). 
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Section in the fall of 2010 complained that police, prosecutors, and 
judges criticize defense counsel when they pursue even nondeceptive 
investigative techniques, such as having defense investigators interview 
witnesses. One recounted an instance in which a defense lawyer was 
arrested for simply interviewing the complaining witness in a domestic 
violence case. But these lawyers, while agreeing that defense counsel 
were often unfairly subject to criticism when they pursued legitimate 
investigative methods, divided on whether defense lawyers should be 
given an ethical green light to use investigative deceit. Some felt that 
approving the use of such deceit is an important step in sending a 
message to police, prosecutors, judges, and defense lawyers that defense 
counsel have an obligation and a right to investigate the facts of a case, 
rather than relying solely on what the prosecution hands over during 
discovery. But other defense lawyers felt that approving defense use of 
deceit would augment the chances that defense investigations would be 
criticized and viewed with suspicion. Some also felt that the reality of 
such criticism, which they believed was unlikely to change, makes many 
defense lawyers wary of using investigative deceit and, thus, the 
proposed advantages to the defense would ultimately prove illusory. 
E. PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM 
A former prosecutor who favors a symmetrical approach of allowing 
both the prosecution and the defense to use investigative deceit made an 
interesting argument based on that prosecutor's experience with the 
generation and disclosure of exculpatory evidence, often referred to as 
"Brady material." This former prosecutor pointed out the questionable 
psychological assumptions underlying the current de facto approach of 
unilaterally exempting only prosecutors from the ethical proscriptions on 
misstatement and deceit in investigations. The current system gives 
primary responsibility for developing the evidence in a case- both 
inculpatory and exculpatory- to the police and prosecution. This 
lawyer's experience had been that police and prosecutors often do a poor 
job of uncovering and disclosing exculpatory evidence, because they lack 
sufficient incentive to do so and are hampered by an array of 
psychological barriers such as "tunnel vision" and nonrational escalation 
of commitment.66 This former prosecutor preferred giving the defense a 
greater arsenal of investigative tools and resources, including the ability 
to conduct its own undercover investigations in appropriate cases, 
because the defense has greater incentive to generate Brady material and 
encounters fewer psychological challenges in seeking out and recognizing 
such evidence. 
66. See generally Alafair Burke, Commentary, Brady's Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor 
and Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE. W. REs. L. REv. 575 (2007). 
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F. ENCOURAGING LEGAL SUPERVISION OF INVESTIGATIONS 
A common and persuasive argument encountered in discussing this 
subject with prosecutors and former prosecutors is grounded on the 
value of encouraging prosecutorial involvement in and legal supervision 
of police investigations. If participation in and supervision of police 
undercover investigations were made unethical, this argument goes, it 
would not end such investigations; it would simply discourage police 
from seeking prosecutorial involvement and advice during the 
investigative phase of a criminal case. It would also discourage prosecutors 
from taking on and encouraging such supervision. Ethical limits on 
prosecutorial participation in investigative deceit would tempt the police 
to wait until after the investigation was over to bring their results to the 
prosecutor, in order to avoid putting the prosecutor in an awkward 
position. No one I talked to, whether prosecutor, defense lawyer, or 
judge, thought that less prosecutorial supervision of police is a good idea. 
Again, one can make the same argument about discouraging lawyer 
supervision of defense investigations. If defense lawyer participation in 
investigative deceit is deemed unethical, it will tempt defense 
investigators and savvy clients to conduct investigations without 
consulting or informing defense counsel. When applied to defense 
counsel, this argument may carry less weight than it does when applied to 
prosecutors, since defense investigators who are hired and paid by 
defense counsel may be viewed as less likely to act without consulting 
defense counsel. Additionally, any loss of legal supervision on the 
defense side may appear less ominous than a similar loss of supervision 
of police. 
G. IMAGE OF THE PROFESSION 
A widely shared concern about allowing lawyers to advise and 
supervise investigative deception is a potentially negative impact on the 
image of the legal profession and the criminal justice system. Here one 
may draw a distinction between prosecutorial and defense counsel 
participation in deceit. Negative public response to government 
investigative deceit seems less likely today than it once did. It is, after all, 
sympathetically portrayed in countless movies, television programs, and 
novels. Is public response likely to be negative to defense, as opposed to 
prosecutorial, supervision of investigative deceit? If such deception helps 
to reveal truth and to decrease the number of convictions of the 
innocent, the public response to such deceit might well be positive. 
H. A SLIPPERY SLOPE 
Another argument against allowing investigative deception is that 
once lying is allowed, it will be hard to set and enforce boundaries on it. 
If defense lawyers, for example, are allowed to use deception in the 
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:1377 
investigative phase of a criminal case because it is useful and necessary in 
revealing truth, then why not allow lawyers to use deception inside the 
courtroom based on the same rationales? 
CONCLUSION 
What about the American Bar Association's Criminal Justice 
Standards? After all, the Criminal Justice Standards and proposed 
changes to them are the focal point of this issue. They prompted the 
roundtable discussions that gave me the opportunity to hear the views of 
many prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges on investigative deceit 
and gave rise to the writing of this Essay. What do the Standards say 
about investigative deceit? What should they say? 
The current Standards as well as the proposed changes to them do 
not explicitly address investigative deceit. That is why this Essay focuses 
on the drafting and interpretation of state ethics rules modeled on the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These state ethics rules, as well as 
opinions interpreting them, rather than the Standards, have provided the 
focal point for recent discussion, controversy, and change regarding 
investigative deceit. 
The primary goal of the Standards is to express consensus among 
prosecutors, defense counsel and judges on important criminal justice 
issues. While there appears to be little current controversy about 
prosecutors supervising investigative deceit, the same cannot be said 
about defense use of investigative deceit. The roundtable discussions 
described in this Essay indicated that attitudes about defense use of 
investigative deceit are still divided, even among defense counsel. Recent 
changes in the ethics rules of states such as Wisconsin and Oregon 
indicate that these attitudes are also in a period of transition. The 
consensus that ideally underlies an ABA Criminal Justice Standard, 
then, simply does not currently exist regarding defense use of 
investigative deceit. 
Will consensus about defense use of investigative deceit ever exist? 
The answer to that question will depend on how jurisdictions across the 
United States react in coming years to the trend of acceptance of such 
deceit emerging from jurisdictions such as Wisconsin and Oregon. 
